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appears that New York and federal law analyze such drug testing
procedures in a similar manner.
People v. Bora51
(decided May 3, 1994)
Defendant claimed that evidence discovered subsequent to a
police officer's command to stop violated his state 52 and
federal5 3 constitutional right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Defendant argued that the evidence should
have been suppressed because the command to stop amounted to
an unlawful seizure of his person, since the officer had directed
him to stop without first having the prerequisite "reasonable
basis" to believe that the defendant was involved in criminal
activity. 54 The New York Court of Appeals held that the police
officer's command to stop did not constitute a seizure under New
York law, and thus the evidence was admissible in his
prosecution for possession of a controlled substance. 55
On June 1, 1989, two police officers received a report over
their patrol car radio that a black male dressed in red and blue
clothes was selling drugs on a Manhattan street comer. 5 6 Upon
arriving at the comer, they saw Antonio Bora standing among a
group of people. 57 He was the only individual matching the
description given to the officers. 5 8 When one of the officers
exited the patrol car, Bora looked in the direction of the officers,
51. 83 N.Y.2d 531, 634 N.E.2d 168, 611 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1994).
52. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 Section 12 states in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.... "
53. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... ."

54. Bora, 83"N.Y.2d at 534, 634 N.E.2d at 169, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
55. Id. at 536, 634 N.E.2d at 171, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 799.

56. Id. at 533, 634 N.E.2d at 169, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 797.
57. Id.
58. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1995

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 [1995], Art. 63

SEARCH & SEIZURE

19951

1107

and moved away as the officer approached him.59 The officer
directed Bora to stop, but Bora fled, discarding a paper bag
containing crack cocaine. 60 The police subsequently apprehended
and arrested Bora, and recovered the bag. 6 1 Bora made a motion
to suppress the crack cocaine recovered by police officers. 62 He
asserted that the officer's direction to stop was improper since the
officer lacked the reasonable suspicion required for a lawful
seizure. 63 Accordingly, Bora argued that the cocaine should be
suppressed because it was the fruit of unlawful police conduct. 64
The motion was denied 65 and Bora pled guilty to criminal
66
possession of a controlled substance.
The appellate division upheld Bora's conviction, stating that the
officers had a sufficient basis to make a common-law inquiry into
his conduct and that Bora's attempt to flee provided them with
the requisite reasonable suspicion to pursue him. 6 7 The appellate
division ruled that reasonable suspicion was adequately formed
based upon several factors: the officers' observations, including
the matching description, the defendant's presence at the scene,
and his conduct upon observing the approaching officers. 68
Before the court of appeals, Bora argued that the officers
lacked reasonable suspicion at the moment they directed him to

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 191 A.D.2d 384, 385-86, 595 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438-39 (1st Dep't 1993)
aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 531, 634 N.E.2d 168, 611 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1994). The court
denied Bora's motion, which relied upon much of the same state precedent in
the instant appeal, because the officers, having received a tip, had a commonlaw right to inquire that he had been "'activated by a founded suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.'" Id. at 385, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 439 (citation omitted).
Bora's attempt to flee and the officer's corroboration of the tip supplied them

with reasonable suspicion of Bora's criminal activity. Id. In this appeal, Bora
did not explicitly raise any state or federal constitutional issues.
68. Id. at 386, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
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stop. 69 He claimed that under the New York Constitution and
New York's common law rules on seizure and investigative
inquiry, reasonable suspicion is required at the time the command
to stop is made, otherwise evidence obtained thereafter should be
70
inadmissible as the product of an illegal seizure.
In affirming the lower court's decision, the New York Court of
Appeals acknowledged that there were no "bright line" rules
available for resolving the issue of whether an officer's command
to stop constitutes an unlawful seizure. 7 1 To answer this
72
question, the court utilized a test enunciated in People v. Hicks,
which asks "whether a reasonable person would have believed,
under the circumstances, that the officer's conduct was a
significant limitation on his or her freedom." 73 Several factors
are considered when such a test is to be applied. 74 In Bora, the
court held that the language used by the officer was not so
75
intimidating and forceful as to constitute a seizure.
Although the court recognized that the text pertaining to search
and seizure in both the State and Federal Constitutions is
identical, it noted that New York interprets these words
differently than the federal courts. 7 6 The court explained New
69. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d at 533-34, 634 N.E.2d at 169-70, 611 N.Y.S.2d at

797-98.
70. Id.

71. Id. at 535-36, 634 N.E.2d at 170-71, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798-99.
72. 68 N.Y.2d 231, 240, 500 N.E.2d 861, 864, 508 N.Y.S.2d 163, 166
(1986) (considering "what a reasonable man, innocent of any crime, would
have thought had been in the defendant's position").

73. Id. at 535, 634 N.E.2d at 170, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798.
74. Id. at 535-36, 634 N.E.2d at 170, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798. The court has
considered whether the officer's gun was drawn, if the defendant's movement
was interrupted, the number of verbal commands given by the officer, the tone

and content of these commands, the number of officers involved, and the place
of the encounter. Id.
75. Id. at 536, 634 N.E.2d at 171, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
76. Id. at 534, 634 N.E.2d at 170, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798. See People v.
Keta, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 496-497, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1342, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920,

934 (1992) (holding that while language of both Federal and State Constitutions
pertaining to unreasonable searches and seizures is generally uniform, New
York interprets its constitution independently to protect its citizens adequately
from unreasonable governmental intrusions).
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York's interpretation by referring to People v. De Bour,7 7 in
which it was held that a seizure can take place even where the
individual is not physically restrained by -officers, or where he
has submitted to "a show of authority."

78

In New York, a

seizure may occur when an officer's actions merely result in a
"significant interruption [of the] individual's liberty of
movement." 79 The court also cited People v. Cantor80 and
United States v. Mendenhall,8 1 in which these courts stated that
an interruption of an individual's movement can be found in the
actual use of force by an officer or by the individual's submission
to the authority of an officer.
Bora claimed that a uniformed officer's direction to stop is a
sufficient showing of authority and, as a matter of law,
constitutes an unlawful seizure of his person prior to his attempt
to flee. 82 Under New York law, the court recognized that an
officer's command to stop, when coupled with certain behavior
by an officer, may sometimes amount to a seizure. 83 However,
77. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 216, 352 N.E.2d 562, 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 380
(1976).
78. Id. at 217, 352 N.E.2d at 567-68, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
79. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 216, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380.

80. 36 N.Y.2d 106, 111, 324 N.E.2d 872, 876, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509, 515
(1975) (holding that detention of an individual can occur "physically or
constructively" by force or by his or her submission "to the authority of the
badge").
81. 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980). The Supreme Court held that
plainclothes agents who identified themselves to an individual at an airport and
requested her identification was not a seizure, where she could not have
objectively maintained a reason to believe that she was not free to leave. Id. at
555. The Court determined whether an individual is seized by inquiring
whether a reasonable person, in view of the totality of the circumstances,
would not feel free to leave, and whether the person is in fact free to ignore
such questions and walk away. Id.
82. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d at 535, 634 N.E.2d at 170, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798.

83. Id. See People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 727-28, 609 N.E.2d 113, 11415, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761-62 (1992) (holding that an individual was seized
when officers ordered him over a loudspeaker to pull over his car); see also
People v. Boodle, 47 N.Y.2d 398, 400-01, 391 N.E.2d 1329, 1330, 418
N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (1979) (stating that a defendant was seized when he
entered patrol car at request of detectives, who ordered him to keep his hands
visible and, without explanation, began driving away), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
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even though an officer's direction to stop may be considered a
seizure in New York, it usually will not constitute a seizure
unless the police conduct poses a significant limitation on the
individual's freedom, or the language of the officer is so forceful
and intimidating as to constitute a seizure. 84 The New York
Court of Appeals relied on the lower courts' findings that no
seizure took place and that the officer's direction to Bora to stop
was neither forceful nor intimidating. 85 Thus, the officer's
direction to stop, standing alone, was not a seizure. 86
Under federal law, the counterpart case to De Bour and Hicks
is Californiav. HodariD. 87 In HodariD., an officer pursued the
defendant, a juvenile, who fled after seeing him approach in an
unmarked car. 88 The youth discarded a small rock of crack
cocaine when the officer was nearly upon him. 89 Hodari argued
that the evidence should have been suppressed as a fruit of an
illegal seizure because he had been unlawfully seized at the point
when the officer ran toward him. 90 The Supreme Court held that
a seizure requires the use of physical force or a significant
submission to authority. 9 1 Under this test, Hodari was not seized
until the pursuing officer had actually tackled him, which
occurred after Hodari had abandoned the contraband; therefore
the cocaine discarded moments earlier was admissible since it
was obtained before any possible seizure by the police officer. 92
969 (1979); People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 99-100, 359 N.E.2d 402, 40405, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895-96 (1976) (holding that a seizure occurred when
plainclothes officer in unmarked car, with gun drawn, approached two
individuals and shouted, "Freeze, police.").
84. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d at 534-36, 634 N.E.2d at 170-71, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
798-99.
85. Id. at 535-36, 634 N.E.2d at 170-71, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798-99.
86. Id. at 536, 634 N.E.2d at 170-71, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 798-99.
87. 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) ("[Seizure] does not remotely apply.., to
the prospect of a policeman yelling 'Stop in the name of the law!' at a fleeing
form that continues to flee.").
88. Id. at 622-23.
89. Id. at 623.
90. Id. at 625-26.
91. Id. at 626.
92. Id. at 629.
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The facts in Bora are comparable to those in Hodari D. The
text of the Federal and State Constitutions regarding the right
against unreasonable search and seizure is identical. The outcome
of the case is the same as it would have been under federal law.
The difference between federal and state law on this issue is the
narrow rule that a New York court may interpret an officer's
forceful command to stop as a seizure, whereas a federal court
may not make such an interpretation. 93

93. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 30 (1968) (holding that a seizure
exists anytime an officer restrains an individual's freedom, and that a brief
seizure may be supported by ieasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot
coupled with the officers reasonable fear for his own safety and the safety of
others); see also People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 449, 606 N.E.2d 951,
953, 591 N.Y.S.2d 823, 825 (1992) (holding that a defendant had no grounds
to object to the opening of a box that the defendant abandoned during a police
pursuit); People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 193, 590 N.E.2d 204, 211, 581
N.Y.S.2d 619, 626 (1992) (ruling that officer's questioning of two bus
passengers about their luggage, whether they were together, and what their
destinations were, was held to be reasonably related to the previously observed
nervous conduct of the passengers and thus was permissible although such
conduct was not necessarily demonstrative of criminal activity); People v.
Leung, 68 N.Y.2d 734, 736, 497 N.E.2d 687, 688, 506 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321-22
(1986) (holding that an officer may pursue or stop an individual if the officer
has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot); People v. De Bour,
40 N.Y.2d 210, 220-21, 352 N.E.2d 562, 570, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 383 (1976)
(holding that an officer's questioning of an individual need not depend upon
indications of criminal activity, but that there must be reasonable suspicion to
justify a seizure or pursuit where the officer stopped an individual, late at night
in an area known for drug trafficking, and after noticing a conspicuous bulge
under the individual's jacket, asked him to open his jacket revealing a gun).
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